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euro area and in its member countries. The research of the IPN combines theoretical and 
empirical analyses using three data sources: individual consumer and producer prices; 
surveys on firms’ price-setting practices; aggregated sectoral, national and area-wide 
price indices. Patterns, causes and policy implications of inflation persistence are 
addressed. 
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Governors of the Federal Reserve System) act as external consultants and Gonzalo 
Camba-Méndez as Secretary. 
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final publication. The views expressed in the paper are the author’s own and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Eurosystem. 
 3
ECB






2 Rule of thumb expectations and
inflation targets 8
2.1 Rule of thumb expectations can
be micro-founded 8
2.2 Inflation targets can gear rule
of thumb expectations 10
3 How well do you forecast inflation if you
believe in the central bank’s target? 10
3.1 Choice of the quantified inflation
objectives 11
3.2 Econometric forecast benchmarks
and estimation 11
3.3 The published forecasts benchmark 14
4 The benefits of having agents believing
in the inflation objective 15
5 Conclusion 17
References 17
Tables and figures 19
European Central Bank working paper series 25 
 
 
Abstract: This paper first shows that the forecast error incurred when assuming that future 
inflation will be equal to the inflation target announced by the central bank is typically at least as 
small and often smaller than forecast errors of model-based and published inflation forecasts. It 
then shows that there are substantial benefits in having rule-of-thumb agents who simply trust 
that the central bank will deliver its pre-announced inflation objective. 
Keywords: monetary policy, credibility, inflation targeting, inflation forecast 
JEL codes: E5  
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Non technical summary 
The spreading of inflation targeting and other forms of quantified inflation objectives has 
marked monetary policy history since 1990. Indeed, a majority of industrialised countries 
have either adopted some form of inflation targeting or, most notably for the 12 countries that 
form the euro area, defined a quantified inflation objective.  
In theory, a major virtue of quantified inflation objectives is to anchor inflation expectations. 
One reason why inflation expectations are important is that economic agents who adjust 
prices and wages do so infrequently. Agents form expectations on the general level of prices 
over the horizon of their “nominal contracts”. The credibility of the central bank’s target 
implies that economic agents “trust” the central bank and expect that the general price level 
will grow at the rate of the inflation target. This expectation mechanism itself helps deliver 
realised inflation close to the target. 
While this argument is convincing and well accepted, there has been so far little research on 
the reasons why economic agents should trust the central bank target or whether there could 
be some incentives to do so. 
This paper therefore proposes a simple evaluation of the benefits of trusting the central bank 
target. The evaluation consists of comparing the forecasting performance of benchmark 
forecasts of inflation (model-based and published forecasts) to the forecasting performance of 
forecasts which are set equal to the inflation target.  
The results provide unconditional support for trusting the inflation targeting (IT) central 
banks, in particular when forming inflation expectations over long horizons. In all seven IT 
developed countries and in the euro area, forecasting that inflation will be at the inflation 
“target” implies a smaller forecasting error than either a random walk or AR(2) model of 
inflation – which we take as representative of econometric model based forecasts of inflation - 
for both the 4 and 8 quarters horizon forecasts. Forecasting inflation to be at the target also 
beats the Consensus forecast for the euro area, Canada, Sweden and Switzerland, while it 
does as well as the Consensus forecast for the UK. 
To our knowledge, our paper is the first one to show that, while inflation is never exactly at 
the target, “trusting” the central bank’s target has provided an ex ante reliable and, to a large 
extent, unbeatable inflation forecasting device for countries that have adopted a quantified 
inflation objective.  
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This in turn should help central banks to stabilise inflation at the pre-announced target level.The result could be and perhaps should be used by central banks in their communication as it 
may induce more agents to choose the inflation target as a rule of thumb inflation forecast. 
This would in turn make it more likely that the target is actually hit or at least that low and 
stable inflation is maintained. We further illustrate this point by using a stylised 3- equation 
new Keynesian type of model where a proportion of agents trust the central bank’s target. We 
then describe the dynamics of standard shocks depending on the proportion of such agents in 
the overall population. The larger this proportion the lower the effects of cost-push shocks and 
demand shocks on inflation and on the interest rate and the more stable inflation and interest 
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December 2005“For a successful and credible central bank like the Federal Reserve, the immediate benefits 
of adopting a more explicit communication strategy may be modest. Nevertheless, making the 
investment now in greater transparency about the central bank's objectives, plans, and 
assessments of the economy could pay increasing dividends in the future.”
1  





The growing use of inflation targeting and other forms of quantified inflation objectives has marked the 
history of monetary policy since 1990. Indeed, a majority of industrialised countries have either adopted 
some form of inflation targeting or, most notably for the 12 countries that form the euro area, defined a 
quantified inflation objective.  
In theory, a major virtue of quantified inflation objectives is to anchor expectations of inflation. This in 
turn should help central banks to stabilise inflation at the pre-announced target level
2. One reason why 
inflation expectations are important is that economic agents who adjust prices and wages do so 
                                                 
1 Extract from “A Perspective on Inflation Targeting”, remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke. At the Annual 
Washington Policy Conference of the National Association of Business Economists, Washington, D.C. March 25, 
2003. 
2 See the discussion in Castelnuovo et al. (2004), Levin et al. (2004) and Svensson (1999) and the above quote by 
Governor Bernanke. 
 
2005 and references therein). Agents form their expectations of the general level of prices over the horizon 
of their “nominal contracts”. The credibility of the central bank’s target implies that economic agents 
“trust” the central bank and expect that the general price level will grow at the rate of the inflation target. 
This expectation mechanism itself helps deliver realised inflation close to the target. 
While this argument is convincing and well accepted, there has so far been little research into the reasons 
why economic agents should trust the central bank target, or whether there might be incentives to do so. 
This paper therefore proposes a simple evaluation of the benefits of trusting the central bank target. The 
evaluation consists of comparing the forecasting performance of benchmark forecasts of inflation (model-
based and published forecasts) with the forecasting performance of forecasts which are set equal to central 
bank inflation targets.  
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infrequently (for most up-to-date evidence, see Dhyne et al., 2005; Fabiani et al, 2005, Vermulen et al. particular when forming inflation expectations over long horizons. In all seven IT developed countries and 
in the euro area, forecasting that inflation will be at the inflation “target” produces a smaller forecasting 
error than either a random walk or AR(2) model of inflation – which we take as representative of 
econometric model-based inflation forcasting - for both the 4- and 8-quarter horizon forecasts. Forecasting 
inflation to be at the target also beats the Consensus forecast for the euro area, Canada, Sweden and 
Switzerland, while it does as well as the Consensus forecast for the UK. 
To our knowledge, our paper is the first to show that, while inflation is never exactly at the target, 
“trusting” the central bank’s target has provided an ex ante reliable and, to a large extent, unbeatable 
inflation forecasting device for countries that have adopted a quantified inflation objective.  
The result could be - and perhaps should be - used by central banks in their communications as it could 
induce more agents to choose central bank inflation targets as their rule-of-thumb inflation forecast. This 
would in turn make it more likely that the central bank target is actually hit, or at least that low and stable 
inflation is maintained. We further illustrate this point by using a stylised 3-equation new Keynesian type 
of model, where a proportion of agents trust the central bank’s target. We then describe the dynamics of 
standard shocks depending on the proportion of such agents in the overall population. The larger this 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the role of inflation targets in the 
formation of inflation expectations. Section 3 reports the results of a horse race of inflation forecasting 
between believers in the central bank’s target and believers in other forecasts. Section 4 illustrates, by way 
of a simple extended New Keynesian Hybrid Philips Curve, how the proportion of believers in central 
 
bank targets affects the response of inflation to standard shocks and the variance of inflation, the output 
gap and the central bank interest rate. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Rule of thumb expectations and inflation targets  
2.1 Rule of thumb expectations can be micro-founded 
The formation of inflation expectations plays a large role in the success of monetary policy. Since all 
prices and wages cannot be readjusted constantly, anchoring inflation expectations at a low level is 
essential to ensure price stability. 
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proportion the lower the effects of cost-push shocks and demand shocks on inflation and on the interest 
The results provide unconditional support for trusting inflation targeting (IT) central banks, in 
rate, and the more stable inflation and interest rates. The academic debate on inflation expectations has centred on the operational mode of expectation 
formation. However, inflation expectations are not observable. As a result, several views on expectations 
formation which are mutually exclusive cannot easily be proven to be inconsistent with the data (Linde, 
2001).   
The most popular view has long been to consider that inflation expectations are rational. Rational 
expectations take two complementary meanings. First, expectations need to fulfil certain criteria to be 
“rational’. Thus rational expectations cannot be systematically or persistently “wrong”. As a result, a good 
approximation of rational expectations is the result of a regression of future realisations of inflation on 
past and present observable economic variables. By construction, this procedure yields expectation errors 
which are zero on average. In addition, if the set of economic variables taken into account is 
comprehensive enough, this procedure is consistent with the requirement that expectations take into 
account all available information. The second meaning of rational expectations formulates that in any 
given model of the economy, agents form their expectations in a way which is consistent with the 
functioning of the model. Although the assumption of rational expectations is largely used in micro-
founded models, it is often rejected when these models are brought to the data (Rudd and Whelan, 2003). 
As Sargent (1993) stresses, “model consistent” expectations are obviously not realistic since only very few 
highly technical economists would be able to solve dynamic macroeconomic models to formulate their 
expectations. The “learning” literature and the more recent discussion of rational inattention (Sims 2003, 
Mankiw and Reis (2002), Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2005) model processes of expectation formation 
that deviate from rational expectations. In essence, the cost of information processing can justify that 
agents recourse to “rules of thumbs” to form expectations about future inflation. 
In particular, inflation expectations seem to depend significantly on past and present values of inflation 
(e.g. Estrela and Fuhrer 1999). Note that such “rule of thumb” expectations are not necessarily irrational to 
 
the extent that rules deriving future inflation from its past values may be the most efficient use of current 
available information to derive the outlook for inflation. A good rationale for such rule of thumb is 
precisely that inflation proves extremely difficult to forecast with multivariate economic models (Stock 
and Watson, 1999a and 1999b; Banerjee et al., 2003 and Banerjee and Marcellino, 2003). Simple rules of 
thumb may therefore optimally solve the trade-off between accuracy of the expectations and effort spent 
to derive them. However, especially at times of persistent changes in inflation, such backward looking 
rules will lead to recurring forecast errors of persistent signs. 
9
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Most analytical studies of inflation targeting assume that agents form rational expectations and accept that 
the central bank will aim at stabilising inflation at the pre-announced target (e.g. Svenson, 1999 and 
references therein). These papers do not however evaluate whether, when applied to inflation 
expectations, rational expectation is a good approximation of the way the real world form expectations, 
nor why adopting an inflation target would suffice to eliminate time inconsistency related inflation biases
3. 
Ideally, one should derive an endogenous mechanism within which agents can estimate with some 
recursive update the likelihood that the central will pursue its inflation target. To some extent, Orphanides 
and Williams (2003) undertake this difficult challenge. However, their model does not allow the central 
bank to be fully credible, at least for some agents, with respect to the achievement of a quantified inflation 
objective. It is only through establishing a track record of being hawkish that the central bank manages to 
anchor expectations. This contrasts somewhat with the experience of central banks that manage to stabilise 
inflation from the inception of inflation targeting regimes.  
In addition, any modelling exercise of the type implemented by Orphanides and Williams (2003) requires 
many assumptions on the model underlying the economy, the information set available to the agents and 
the central bank, etc A much simpler alternative is to use the experience of inflation targeting countries to 
evaluate the benefits to agents of actually taking the inflation target seriously enough so as to use it as 
their inflation forecast.  
The forecast error of this rule of thumb is given by the deviation of realised inflation from the pre-
announced target. It is different from zero because the central bank cannot deliver that inflation is exactly 
on target at every period. However, whether this forecast error is big or small will depend on one’s 
benchmarks. 
                                                 
3 An exception is Clark, Goodhart and Huang (1999) who analyse a trade off between inflation and output variances 
even though the central bank is not trying to raise unemployment below the natural rate.  
 
The following section proposes to answer this question by comparing the forecast error of forecasting the 
pre-announced objective to two benchmarks: an econometric model based forecast and the economists’ 
forecasts as published by Consensus Economics (henceforth “Consensus”). 
 
3.  How well do you forecast inflation if you believe in the central bank’s target? 
We first check how accurate “forecasts” of agents taking the central bank’s target for granted (henceforth 
“target forecast”) would perform compared with forecasts based either on a Random Walk or on an AR(2) 
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evaluation, have proved difficult to beat when trying to forecast inflation (Stock and Watson 2004; 
Banerjee et al., 2004).  
3.1 Choice of the quantified inflation objectives 
The paths of inflation targets or quantified inflation objectives are shown in Table 1. For the first seven 
countries of the sample, these paths are relatively straightforward. They correspond to the objectives 
stated by the central banks and take into account the medium-term nature of the central banks’ objective, 
which we interpret as a two-year horizon.
4 Thus, a target announced at a given time should be reflected in 
inflation expectations for two years in the future. Inflation objectives are sometimes specified in terms of 
ranges. Following Castelnuovo et al (2004), we take the mid-point of the range in order to have a point 
estimate to which actual inflation can be compared.  
In the case of the euro area, the choice of a specific number for the inflation quantified objective is 
somewhat more delicate. In 1998, the ECB had defined that its inflation objective was a positive inflation 
rate inferior to 2 %, over the medium run. In May 2003, the ECB clarified that its inflation objective is 
below but close to 2%.
5 Consistent with this, we set the inflation objective for the euro area at 1.9 %. 
While this choice is somewhat arbitrary and not necessarily in line with the perception of the ECB 
objective between 1999 and 2003, we chose this level of inflation objective because it is consistent with 
the ECB strategy both before and after its evaluation of May 2003. 
 
3.2 Econometric forecast benchmarks and estimation 
We start by comparing the target forecasts with model-based forecasts from two types of benchmarks, 
AR(2) processes and random walks of the first difference of inflation, which have been shown to perform 
relatively well in inflation forecasting competitions. Thus, if the target forecasts prove more accurate than 
                                                 
4 See for instance, Castelnuevo et al.(2003). 
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  these benchmarks, we can be confident that they would be more accurate than most inflation 
forecasts based on macroeconomic models. We first estimate the models on the first differences of 
the quarter-on-quarter inflation rate because this specification is robust with respect to occurrences 
of breaks in the mean of inflation. The simplest form of the AR(2) model and the Random Walk 
models that we estimate are described as follows.                                                   
6
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(1a)  t t t t C ε π β π α π + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ − − 2 1  
(2a)  t t t t η π π π + − = ∆ − − 2 1 ,  
where  ) ( ) ( 1 − − = t t t P Log P Log π , with P the level of the price index, ∆ is the first difference 
operator and  t t η ε ,  are error terms.  
Second, in line with Labhard, Kapetanios and Price (2005), we take into account potential breaks in 
the dynamics of inflation due by announcements of changes in the inflation objective by the central 
banks.
6 Hence, we enrich the AR(2) and the RW models by allowing for changes in the intercept 8 
quarters after a change in the inflation target. For a given country, we have as many changes in the 
intercept as changes in the quantitative inflation objective. In the case of Australia, for instance, the 
central bank announced its objective in 1993, and has not changed it since. We therefore include 
one step dummy taking a zero value before 1995 (1993 plus two years) and 1 thereafter. We refer 
to this second set of models, which are reported in (1b) and (2b), as ‘AR(2) with breaks’ and  
‘random walks with breaks’:  
(1b)    t t t
i
i i o t Ind C C ε π β π α π + ∆ + ∆ + + = ∆ − − ∑ 2 1
(2b)    t t t
i
i i t Ind C η π π π + − + = ∆ − − ∑ 2 1
i
Finally, for completeness, we also run forecasts for models specified in levels:  
(1c)    t t t i i t Ind C C ε βπ απ π + + + + = − − ∑ 2 1
(2c)    t t
i
i i t Ind C η π π + + = − ∑ 1
π ~
  where Ind is a dummy variable that takes a value one from 8 quarters after the announced change in the 
target.  
inflation rates. The out of sample forecast evaluation is then carried out in real time. For example, the  
testimation, we calculate forecasts   of the models at horizons 1 quarter, 4 quarters (actually the average 
of the next 4 quarters) and 8 quarters (actually the average of quarters 5 to 8) ahead. 
 However, an obvious weakness of this model is that it assumes that the econometrician himself is convinced that 
We estimate the models from the first quarter of 1985 onwards on annualised quarter-on-quarter 












                                                 
targets were already in place in 1995. Second, the more recent post 2001evaluation sample allows us to check 
whether, while the inflation targeting regimes already had gain fully credibility, the rule of thumb of forecasting the 
“target” can still out perform the consensus forecast and the AR(2) which parameters will, by construction, mainly 
reflect inflation dynamics in the new “inflation targeting” regime. We keep the same evaluation samples also for the 
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(3)  
[ ] [ ]
() [] []
() [] [] 1996
*
1996 4 : 1996 3 : 1996 2 : 1996 1 : 1996
1995
*
1995 4 : 1995 3 : 1995 2 : 1995 1 : 1995
1 : 1995
*
1 : 1995 1 : 1995
nd       ~ ~ ~ ~ * 25 . 0
nd       ~ ~ ~ ~ * 25 . 0
nd                                                                ~
π π π π π π π
π π π π π π π
π π π π
− − + + +





Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q
 
The set-up is brought forward sequentially by one quarter until the end of the evaluation sample.  
Tables 2a, 2b and 2c (Tables 3a, 3b and 3c) show the ratio of Root Mean Square Errors (RMSE)
of target forecasts to our three AR(2) forecasts (Random Walk), for inflation in first difference 
without and with breaks and for inflation in levels with breaks, calculated from 1995 to 2004 and 
from 2001 to 2004.
7 Numbers below 1 indicate that target forecasts are on average more accurate 
than the model-based benchmarks over the period of reference.  
As shown in Table 2a, for forecast horizons of 4 and 8 quarters, taking the central bank’s target as 
forecast yields significantly more accurate forecasts than an AR(2), and hence, given the evidence 
reported in Stock and Watson (2004) and Banerjee et al., (2004), than most inflation forecast 
models. Taking the example of Australia, forecast errors from target forecasts are around half as 
large as forecast errors from AR(2) processes over 1995 to 2004. This results also holds when we 
introduce breaks in the AR(2) process corresponding to the introduction of quantitative inflation 
objectives and changes thereof (Table 2b). Similar results are obtained for the comparison of the 
target forecasts with random walk forecasts as shown in Tables 3a, 3b and 3c.  
Finally, our simple target forecast out performs the AR(2) model of the inflation level with breaks 
(Table 2c) in a majority of cases, however less systematically and by a smaller margin than for the 
RW models and the AR(2) of the first difference of inflation. It should be noted, however, that this 
model has in common with our simple target forecast to take for granted that the announcement of 
the target will indeed affect the inflation process.  
*
 While somewhat arbitrary, the choice of these two evaluation periods has several advantages. First, most inflation 
7
central bank quantified objective π  , defined as follows: 
Then we store the associated forecast errors and the one of taking the inflation forecast equal to the 3.3 The published forecasts benchmark  
In addition, we compare target forecasts to Consensus forecasts. As mentioned before, we compare the 
target forecasts to several alternatives. One is the Consensus forecast which should represent informed 
forecasts produced on the basis of comprehensive information sets. Notably, respondents to the Consensus 
surveys should be aware of the central bank’s inflation objective. Consensus forecasts depart from the 
central bank’s stated objective depending on the degree of credibility that such an objective will be 
achieved, and, especially for shorter horizons, on various factors which economists estimate will make 
actual inflation deviate from the target.  
Consensus data are available since 1990 for Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK, providing 
forecasts for the current and following year. For the euro area, Consensus forecasts are available as of 
2002. We calculate Consensus forecasts of the euro area pre-2002 based on forecasts for the countries 
(except Luxembourg), with fixed weights corresponding to the countries’ share in euro area consumption . 
This current and following year framework differs from the rolling forecast horizon of the previous horse 
race. In order to compare the performance of the Consensus with the degree of accuracy which target 
forecasts would have yielded had they been formed at the same time as the Consensus surveys, attention 
needs to be paid to the calendar of inflation data releases and the timetable of the Consensus surveys. 
Publication delays of inflation data differ between countries and, in some cases, have changed over the 
time period under consideration. However, inflation data are typically published around one month after 
the end of the reference period. Meanwhile, the Consensus survey results for a month M correspond to 
answers collected up to the middle of month M-1. The following comparisons can therefore be made: 
•  Consensus forecasts of inflation in the current year published in November can be made 
using inflation data available up to September. The only unknown inflation path included 
in these forecasts is for the last quarter of the year. These Consensus forecasts are 
therefore are compared with one-quarter ahead target forecasts (which are linked to actual 
data for the first three quarters of the year). 
                                                 
speaking forecasts for the euro area economy. However, unless respondents of a particular country have systematic 
biases in their inflation forecast, the average inflation forecast across countries should be close to a forecast by an 
“average” forecaster for the average of the countries, i.e. for the euro area as a whole. 
 
•  Forecasts of inflation in the current year published in February rely on inflation data up to 
December of the previous year. The whole year therefore needs to be forecast. These 
forecasts are compared with four-quarter ahead target forecasts. 
14
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 Since respondents to the Consensus vary from country to country, these euro area constructs are not strictly-
8
8•   Similarly, forecasts of inflation in the following year published in February are compared 
with eight-quarter ahead target forecasts. 
Table 4 shows the relative Root Mean Square Errors of target forecasts compared with the Consensus. For 
inflation two years ahead, using the central bank’s target would yield at least as accurate forecasts as the 
Consensus. For the euro area and Switzerland, a target forecast is even significantly better than the 
Consensus for two-year ahead forecasts, especially in the period since 2001, as the latter has 
systematically underestimated actual inflation.  
Altogether, we provided strikingly sharp evidence that forecasting the inflation target/objective has led, in 
a vast majority of cases to a forecast error smaller than the existing alternatives. 
One caveat applying to these results is that they are based on relatively short samples, due to availability 
of Consensus forecasts for the past 15 years only and the even more recent switch to quantified inflation 
objectives by central banks. However, the paths of the forecasts obtained from the AR(2), the Consensus 
and central banks´ targets suggest that differences in relative average errors are significant.  
 
4.  The benefits of having agents believing in the inflation objective  
This section uses a stylised dynamic model of the business cycle to illustrate the benefits of having 
convinced some (as many as possible) agents in the economy to expect that future inflation will be a the 
inflation target. 
The model consists of three equations: 
The IS curve and the Taylor rule are standard. In the former, the output gap y depends on its past and 
expected values, on a real ex ante interest rate and a demand shock η:   
() [] [ ] () t t t t t t t t E r y E y y η π γ ϕ ϕ + − − − + = + + − 1 1 1 1  
In the central bank interest rate rule, the difference between the nominal interest rate r inflation target π* 
depends on its past value, on the deviation of inflation from the central bank inflation target π*and the 
output gap y : 
() ( ) ( ) () t t t t y r r λ π π θ ρ π ρ π + − − + − = − − * 1 * * 1  
 
The third equation is an extended Hybrid New Keynesian Philips Curve (H-NKPC):  
() () ( ) [ ] t t t t t t y E ε β π α π α π α α π + + − + − + = + − 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 *  
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among the α0 fraction of agents that use rule of thumbs,  (1-α1 ) assume that inflation will be equal to the 
previous period’s inflation and α1 consider that inflation will be equal to the target of the central bank π*. 
We calibrate the model’s parameters at standard values. The lagged dependent variable has a coefficient 
of 0.5 in the three equations; the Taylor coefficients, which are defined for a rule on the real interest rate, 
are 0.5 for the deviation of inflation from its target and 0.5 for the output gap. The transmission 
mechanism coefficients β and γ are both equal to 0.1. The two shocks to the Philips curve and to the IS 
curve are assumed to be normal with a 1 % standard deviation and orthogonal to one another. Finally, we 
set the inflation target π* at 2 % and we assume that half the agents form model-consistent expectations, 
i.e. α0 = 0.5.  
We first compare, in Table 5, the standard deviations of inflation, output and the interest rate for this 
three-equation economy, under different assumptions for α1 . The higher α1
1
, the smaller the standard 
deviation of inflation and the interest rate. In contrast, the variance of the output gap is hardly affected by 
changes in α .  
These results can be better understood by comparing the profile of the impulse responses of inflation and 
the output gap following a demand shock and a cost push shock for the same values of α1 as reported in 
Figure 1. The larger the share of rule of thumb agents that expect inflation to be at the target, the faster 
inflation goes back to the target, and, in the case of cost push shocks, the smaller the recession induced by 
the central bank reaction to the shock.  
However, following a demand shock, the output gap is slower to return to baseline with a higher α1. This 
is because the central bank’s reaction implies a sharper real interest rate increase. For our simulation 
scenario that combines both demand and cost push shocks, the improved output stabilisation following 
cost push shocks is compensated by the loss following demand shocks.  
For a large class of welfare functions that depend on inflation stabilisation, output stabilisation, and 
possibly, financial stability (captured by the stabilisation of the interest rate), seeing more agents using the 
inflation target as “rule of thumb” inflation expectations is a clear improvement.  
                                                 








5.  Conclusion 
We have shown that quantified inflation objectives can be used as rule of thumb forecasting devices. The 
experience of various countries that have adopted such objectives shows that, to a large extent, such a rule 
of thumb yields smaller forecast errors than forecasting models and the forecast of professional experts 
reported published by Consensus Economics. This result brings further support to the adoption of 
quantified inflation objectives. It should be used in the communication of central banks in order to 
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Table 1: Inflation targets 
 Target  Remarks 
Euro area  1.9%  Positive inflation below 2% up to May 
2003; below but close to 2% thereafter.  
Australia  2.5%  Since 1993, the inflation target is set 
between 2% and 3% 
Canada  Pre 1992Q4: 3% 
1993Q1-1993Q4 : linear reduction to 2% 
1994Q1 onwards: 2% 
Range of 2-4%, focus on mid-point 
“Gradual reduction” to 2%  
Range of 1-3% with focus on mid-point 
announced at the end of 1993 and 
renewed since 
New Zealand  Pre 1998Q4: 1% 
 
1999Q1-2004Q3: 1.5% 
2004Q4 onwards: 2% 
Range of 0-2% announced in March 
1990. Range renewed in subsequent 
Inflation Target Agreements 
Range of 0-3% announced in December 
1996 
Range of 1-3% announced in September 
1992 
Norway 2.5%  Defined  in  2001 
Sweden  2.0%  Quantitative objective announced in 
January 1995 
Switzerland 1.0%  Official  objective is below 2%  
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December 2005Table 2a: Relative RMSE of target forecasts to  
an AR(2) of the first difference of inflation  
 
1Q 4Q 8Q 1Q 4Q 8Q
Euro area 1.49 0.85 0.65 0.85 0.60 0.37
Australia 1.30 0.68 0.57 0.96 0.56 0.51
Canada 0.83 0.50 0.61 0.75 0.46 0.83
Norway 0.89 0.58 0.82 0.89 0.60 1.10
New Zealand 0.89 0.41 0.53 0.47 0.21 0.38
Sweden 1.07 0.73 0.75 0.60 0.42 0.43
Switzerland 1.55 0.94 0.84 1.97 1.04 1.04
UK 1.02 0.39 0.51 0.79 0.29 0.55
Forecast horizon Forecast horizon
As of 1995 As of 2001
 
Values below 1 indicate that target forecasts are more accurate than AR(2) forecasts. 
Table 2b: Relative RMSE of target forecasts to  
an AR(2) of the first difference of inflation with breaks in the mean inflation rate  
1Q 4Q 8Q 1Q 4Q 8Q
Euro area 1.35 0.61 0.65 1.17 0.31 0.31
Australia 1.40 0.75 0.56 1.29 0.72 0.57
Canada 0.83 0.53 0.27 0.75 0.61 0.48
Norway 0.90 0.59 0.52 0.89 0.61 0.52
New Zealand 1.30 0.66 0.71 1.06 0.52 0.58
Sweden 1.23 0.71 0.49 1.09 0.68 0.44






Values below 1 indicate that target forecasts are more accurate than forecasts from an AR(2) with breaks model. 
There is no result for Switzerland since there has not been any announced changes in the central bank’s strategy and 
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Table 2c: Relative RMSE of target forecasts to AR(2) of inflation levels with breaks in the 
mean inflation rate at dates when the target was changed 
1Q 4Q 8Q 1Q 4Q 8Q
Euro area 1.20 0.43 0.65 0.68 0.21 1.20
Australia 1.58 1.00 1.02 1.43 0.86 0.99
Canada 1.06 1.00 0.99 1.03 0.99 0.97
Norway 0.73 0.39 0.83 0.68 0.35 1.05
New Zealand 0.91 0.47 0.75 0.48 0.24 1.24
Sweden 1.32 0.90 1.30 0.76 0.48 0.88
Switzerland 0.49 0.23 0.54 0.32 0.15 0.69
UK 0.66 0.35 0.54 0.47 0.25 0.69
Forecast horizon Forecast horizon
As of 1995 As of 2001
 
Values below 1 indicate that target forecasts are more accurate than forecasts from the AR(2). 
 
Table 3a: Relative RMSE of target forecasts to random walk 
 
1Q 4Q 8Q 1Q 4Q 8Q
Euro area 1.49 0.85 0.65 0.85 0.60 0.37
Australia 1.30 0.68 0.57 0.96 0.56 0.51
Canada 0.83 0.50 0.61 0.75 0.46 0.83
Norway 0.89 0.58 0.82 0.89 0.60 1.10
New Zealand 0.89 0.41 0.53 0.47 0.21 0.38
Sweden 1.07 0.73 0.75 0.60 0.42 0.43
Switzerland 1.55 0.94 0.84 1.97 1.04 1.04
UK 1.02 0.39 0.51 0.79 0.29 0.55
Forecast horizon Forecast horizon
As of 1995 As of 2001
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Table 3b: Relative RMSE of target forecasts to random walk with breaks in the intercept at 
dates when the target was changed 
1Q 4Q 8Q 1Q 4Q 8Q
Euro area 1.35 0.61 0.65 1.17 0.31 0.31
Australia 1.40 0.75 0.56 1.29 0.72 0.57
Canada 0.83 0.53 0.27 0.75 0.61 0.48
Norway 0.90 0.59 0.52 0.89 0.61 0.52
New Zealand 1.30 0.66 0.71 1.06 0.52 0.58
Sweden 1.23 0.71 0.49 1.09 0.68 0.44






Values below 1 indicate that target forecasts are more accurate than random walk forecasts. There is no result 
for Switzerland since there has not been any announced changes in the central bank’s strategy and objective 
for this country. 
 
Table 3c: Relative RMSE of target forecasts to random walk in inflation levels with breaks in 
the mean inflation rate at dates when the target was changed 
1Q 4Q 8Q 1Q 4Q 8Q
Euro area 2.28 0.87 0.63 1.39 0.61 0.45
Australia 1.84 0.76 0.63 1.36 0.64 0.57
Canada 1.20 0.63 0.70 1.14 0.64 0.76
Norway 1.49 0.76 0.79 1.64 0.86 0.74
New Zealand 2.16 0.71 0.71 1.55 0.43 0.43
Sweden 2.31 0.83 0.85 1.75 0.53 0.62






Values below 1 indicate that target forecasts are more accurate than random walk forecasts. 
  
 
Table 4: Relative RMSE of target forecasts to Consensus 
 
1Q 4Q 8Q 1Q 4Q 8Q
Euro area 5.90 1.55 0.84 2.34 0.96 0.69
Canada 2.20 1.10 0.87 1.49 0.74 0.93
Norway 4.44 1.42 1.06 4.00 2.17 1.35
Sweden 2.79 1.05 0.73 3.52 1.32 0.93
Switzerland 3.04 0.93 0.50 2.06 0.64 0.46
UK 1.12 1.02 0.65 7.37 1.49 1.01
Forecast horizon Forecast horizon
As of 1995 As of 2001
 
Values below 1 indicate that target forecasts are more accurate than Consensus forecasts. 
 
 
Table 5: Standard deviation of inflation, output and the interest rate for different α1
α1 Stdev(π) Stdev(y) Stdev(r)
0,1 1,8  2,1  2,2 
0,3 1,5  2,2  1,7 
0,5 1,2  2,1  1,5 
0,7 1,1  2,0  1,3 
0,9 1,1  2,1  1,3 








Figure 1: Impulse response of inflation and the output gap for different values of α1






Cost push shock >> Inflation






Cost push shock >> Output gap






Demand shock >> Inflation





Demand shock >> Output gap
 






Working Paper Series No. 564
December 200525
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 564
December 2005
European Central Bank working paper series
For a complete list of Working Papers published by the ECB, please visit the ECB’s website
(http://www.ecb.int)
518 “Term structure and the sluggishness of retail bank interest rates in euro area countries”
by G. de Bondt, B. Mojon and N. Valla, September 2005.
519 “Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal contraction in new Member States” by A. Rzońca and
P. Ciz ·kowicz, September 2005.
520 “Delegated portfolio management: a survey of the theoretical literature” by L. Stracca,
September 2005.
521 “Inflation persistence in structural macroeconomic models (RG10)” by R.-P. Berben,
R. Mestre, T. Mitrakos, J. Morgan and N. G. Zonzilos, September 2005.
522 “Price setting behaviour in Spain: evidence from micro PPI data” by L. J. Álvarez, P. Burriel
and I. Hernando, September 2005.
523 “How frequently do consumer prices change in Austria? Evidence from micro CPI data”
by J. Baumgartner, E. Glatzer, F. Rumler and A. Stiglbauer, September 2005.
524 “Price setting in the euro area: some stylized facts from individual consumer price data”
by E. Dhyne, L. J. Álvarez, H. Le Bihan, G. Veronese, D. Dias, J. Hoffmann, N. Jonker,
P. Lünnemann, F. Rumler and J. Vilmunen, September 2005.
525 “Distilling co-movements from persistent macro and financial series” by K. Abadir and
G. Talmain, September 2005.
526 “On some fiscal effects on mortgage debt growth in the EU” by G. Wolswijk, September 2005.
527 “Banking system stability: a cross-Atlantic perspective” by P. Hartmann, S. Straetmans and
C. de Vries, September 2005.
528 “How successful are exchange rate communication and interventions? Evidence from time-series
and event-study approaches” by M. Fratzscher, September 2005.
529 “Explaining exchange rate dynamics: the uncovered equity return parity condition”
by L. Cappiello and R. A. De Santis, September 2005.
530 “Cross-dynamics of volatility term structures implied by foreign exchange options”
by E. Krylova, J. Nikkinen and S. Vähämaa, September 2005.
531 “Market power, innovative activity and exchange rate pass-through in the euro area”
by S. N. Brissimis and T. S. Kosma, October 2005.
532 “Intra- and extra-euro area import demand for manufactures” by R. Anderton, B. H. Baltagi,
F. Skudelny and N. Sousa, October 2005.
533 “Discretionary policy, multiple equilibria, and monetary instruments” by A. Schabert, October 2005.26
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 564
December 2005
534 “Time-dependent or state-dependent price setting? Micro-evidence from German metal-working
industries” by H. Stahl, October 2005.
535 “The pricing behaviour of firms in the euro area: new survey evidence” by S. Fabiani, M. Druant,
I. Hernando, C. Kwapil, B. Landau, C. Loupias, F. Martins, T. Y. Mathä, R. Sabbatini, H. Stahl and
A. C. J. Stokman, October 2005.
536 “Heterogeneity in consumer price stickiness: a microeconometric investigation” by D. Fougère,
H. Le Bihan and P. Sevestre, October 2005.
537 “Global inflation” by M. Ciccarelli and B. Mojon, October 2005.
538 “The price setting behaviour of Spanish firms: evidence from survey data” by L. J. Álvarez and
I. Hernando, October 2005.
539 “Inflation persistence and monetary policy design: an overview” by A. T. Levin and R. Moessner,
November 2005.
540 “Optimal discretionary policy and uncertainty about inflation persistence” by R. Moessner,
November 2005.
541 “Consumer price behaviour in Luxembourg: evidence from micro CPI data” by P. Lünnemann
and T. Y. Mathä, November 2005.
542 “Liquidity and real equilibrium interest rates: a framework of analysis” by L.  Stracca,
November 2005.
543 “Lending booms in the new EU Member States: will euro adoption matter?”
by M. Brzoza-Brzezina, November 2005.
544 “Forecasting the yield curve in a data-rich environment: a no-arbitrage factor-augmented
VAR approach” by E. Mönch, November 2005.
545 “Trade integration of Central and Eastern European countries: lessons from a gravity model”
by M. Bussière, J. Fidrmuc and B. Schnatz, November 2005.
546 “The natural real interest rate and the output gap in the euro area: a joint estimation”
by J. Garnier and B.-R. Wilhelmsen, November 2005.
547 “Bank finance versus bond finance: what explains the differences between US and Europe?”
by F. de Fiore and H. Uhlig, November 2005.
548 “The link between interest rates and exchange rates: do contractionary depreciations make a
difference?” by M. Sánchez, November 2005.
549 “Eigenvalue filtering in VAR models with application to the Czech business cycle”
by J. Beneš and D. Vávra, November 2005.
550 “Underwriter competition and gross spreads in the eurobond market” by M. G. Kollo,
November 2005.
551 “Technological diversification” by M. Koren and S. Tenreyro, November 2005.27
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 564
December 2005
552 “European Union enlargement and equity markets in accession countries”
by T. Dvorak and R. Podpiera, November 2005.
553 “Global bond portfolios and EMU” by P. R. Lane, November 2005.
554 “Equilibrium and inefficiency in fixed rate tenders” by C. Ewerhart, N. Cassola and N. Valla,
November 2005.
555 “Near-rational exuberance” by J. Bullard, G. W. Evans and S. Honkapohja, November 2005.
556 “The role of real wage rigidity and labor market frictions for unemployment and inflation
dynamics” by K. Christoffel and T. Linzert, November 2005.
557 “How should central banks communicate?” by M. Ehrmann and M. Fratzscher, November 2005.
558 “Ricardian fiscal regimes in the European Union” by A. Afonso, November 2005.
559 “When did unsystematic monetary policy have an effect on inflation?” by B. Mojon, December 2005.
560 “The determinants of ‘domestic’ original sin in emerging market economies”
by A. Mehl and J. Reynaud, December 2005.
561 “Price setting in German manufacturing: new evidence from new survey data” by H. Stahl,
December 2005
562 “The price setting behaviour of Portuguese firms: evidence from survey data” by F. Martins,
December 2005
563 “Sticky prices in the euro area: a summary of new micro evidence” by L. J. Álvarez, E. Dhyne,
M. Hoeberichts, C. Kwapil, H. Le Bihan, P. Lünnemann, F. Martins, R. Sabbatini, H. Stahl,
P. Vermeulen and J. Vilmunen, December 2005
564 “Forecasting the central bank’s inflation objective is a good rule of thumb” by M. Diron and
B. Mojon, December 2005